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Within a brief span, Congress adopted the Interstate Commerce 
Act (1887) and the Sherman Act (1890). In imposing federal 
regulation on railroads, the Interstate Commerce Act inaugu-
rated the era of substantial federal regulation of individual in-
dustries, while the Sherman Act created a baseline for the con-
trol of competition in the United States by generally barring 
contracts in restraint of trade and forbidding monopolization. 
The rise of the railroads and the great trusts raised concerns 
about economic power and spurred politicians to formulate a 
national policy toward competition. Since 1890, policy makers 
have been forced repeatedly to work through how to interleave 
a fully general approach to competition under the antitrust laws 
with industry-specific approaches to competition under regula-
tory statutes. 
That has been a process of learning, but even without learn-
ing, shifting political winds would naturally lead to fits and 
starts as antitrust and specific regulatory statutes have jostled 
and combined and sometimes even competed in establishing a 
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framework for controlling competition. After more than a cen-
tury of effort, it is possible to advance a few general conclu-
sions. Antitrust can say no but struggles with saying yes. Less 
cryptically, antitrust is a poor framework for price setting or 
for establishing affirmative duties toward rivals. Price setting 
in a non-market context often requires detailed industry knowl-
edge and often turns on political decisions about levels of ser-
vice and the rate of return to capital needed to provide those 
services. The virtue and vice of federal judges is they are gen-
eralists, not industry specialists, and, once appointed, they are 
insulated from the political process. If there is a natural mo-
nopoly and prices need to be set or we are going to create a 
duty to, say, share an incumbent’s phone network with an en-
trant, the evidence suggests that it is generally best to do that 
through (enlightened) regulation, not antitrust, though obvi-
ously poor regulation can impose enormous costs. 
But antitrust says no very well, while regulators often have 
a hard time saying no. Area-specific regulation through special 
agencies gives rise to the fear that the regulators will be cap-
tured by the regulated industry (or other interest groups). Regu-
lators will have come from industry or will dream of exiting to 
private sector salaries. Regulators won’t say no often enough to 
proposals that benefit special interests. But federal judges are 
genuinely independent (or, at least, more so than regulators) 
and the docket of the federal judiciary is completely general. A 
general antitrust statute, implemented by independent federal 
judges—limited to issues within their competence—can protect 
the competitive process, especially with the rise of economic 
reasoning in antitrust. 
Our main conclusion is that in the century-long seesaw bat-
tle over how to design competition policy, the Sherman Act has 
turned out to be more enduring than regulation. As the difficul-
ties of regulation have emerged and as economic reasoning has 
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the Sherman Act through an independent judiciary has shown 
itself to deliver lower prices and less promotion of special in-
terests than regulation, causing a shift away from regulation. 
This does not, of course, mean that all regulation should van-
ish, especially for industries with natural monopoly character-
istics, but rather that, when necessary, regulation should try to 
allow as much competition as possible, constrained only by the 
Sherman Act. Where activities in an industry remain partially 
regulated, antitrust and regulation can be used together in a 
complementary way to control competition and, in some cases, 
it is possible to use antitrust as a constraint on regulators. 
This Chapter is divided into three sections. First, we con-
sider the general question of how competition policy should be 
implemented. We do that by considering possible roles for 
courts and regulatory agencies as set out in the modern politi-
cal science literature on legislative bargaining. We analyze the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of regulation versus an-
titrust as a means of formulating antitrust policy. We then con-
sider one particular question: exclusion from antitrust, or put 
differently, antitrust immunities. Second, we return to the be-
ginning of the formulation of competition policy by consider-
ing the period starting with the Interstate Commerce Act and 
the Sherman Act. This history illustrates the initial view of 
regulation and antitrust as two competing alternatives to con-
trol competition, but with some recognition that the two would 
interact in unforeseen ways. We pursue the central question 
that dominated early competition policy and remains a central 
policy question, namely, how should prices be set? Third, we 
turn our attention to a group of industries that have been a fo-
cus of regulation for over a hundred years—network indus-
tries—and analyze their recent deregulation. We address the 
fundamental question that has occupied and continues to oc-
cupy regulatory and antitrust decisions in those industries: how 
should those markets be structured and specifically what sort of Carlton & Picker  Antitrust and Regulation  5 
 
interconnection rights should be established? We use this re-
cent history to illustrate the movement away from regulation 
toward antitrust, with the two being used as complements to 
control competition in some industries.  
I. Assigning Responsibility for Controlling Competition 
We start by framing the general problem faced by Congress 
and the President in choosing whether and to what extent to 
delegate implementation of a policy to a third party. The dele-
gation will take the form of legislation and the scope of the 
delegation may be determined in part by the specificity of the 
language used in the statute. We want to address that problem 
generally and then turn to what that means for the interaction 
of antitrust and regulation. 
A. The General Setting 
Under the U.S. Constitution, laws are enacted when the Senate, 
the House and the President each vote in favor of a proposed 
bill. That statement simplifies in that it ignores the possibility 
that Congress has sufficient votes (two-thirds in each chamber) 
to override a veto by the President, and it also skips over the 
interesting and tricky issue of the extent to which domestic leg-
islation can be set through the treaty-making power, where the 
President is empowered to make treaties, provided that two-
thirds of the Senate vote in favor. 
Following McCubbins, Noll & Weingast (1989), we treat 
the process of creating legislation as a principal/agent problem 
or, more precisely and more interestingly, as a three princi-
pal/multiple agents problem. It is conventional (see, e.g., Shep-
sle & Bonchek, 1997, pp. 358-68) in the rational choice litera-
ture in political science to model legislation as a principal dele-
gating power to an agent, where either a court or an agency 
acts as the agent in implementing the legislation. In the princi-6    February 13, 2007January 25, 2007 
 
pal/agent problem faced in creating legislation, Congress and 
the President typically delegate to one of two agents: Article III 
courts or specialized agencies subject to court oversight. By 
institutional design, Congress and the President have relatively 
weak controls against the judiciary—we call this separation of 
powers—but, together and separately, the House, Senate and 
President can choose to retain stronger control over agencies. 
Focus on a standard principal/agent problem, namely that 
the agent will depart from the principal’s goals and pursue his 
own. In the political science literature, this is labeled the prob-
lem of bureaucratic drift. For legislation to get passed, the 
House, Senate and President negotiate over potential policies. 
But delegation is inevitable: judges decide actual cases, not 
Congress or the President, and with the rise of the administra-
tive state, implementation of legislation can be delegated di-
rectly to courts or first to agencies with appeals to courts (and 
judicial review of agency action need not be a given). 
The negotiation process that results in unanimous agree-
ment by the House, Senate and President on new legislation 
has to take into account what will happen in the subsequent 
delegation to courts or agencies. Each player in the negotiation 
game should do backwards induction looking forward to see 
how the agent will actually implement the enacted legislation, 
and in light of that, design the legislation. (The players could 
just care about enactment and not about implementation if that 
is how their constituencies keep score, but we will assume that 
all participants are interested in actual results, and not just ap-
pearances.) To match the political science literature, treat the 
House (H), Senate (S), President (P) and agent as each having 
preferences over the particular policy in question and focus on 
the essential dynamic that takes place among our four players. 
After negotiation, unanimity is reached and a bill is passed (ab-
sent unanimity nothing happens). The agent now implements 
the legislation. Carlton & Picker  Antitrust and Regulation  7 
 
What constrains how the agent does so? Consider possible 
sources of restrictions: the original legislation; oversight and 
monitoring; internal agency norms; and the threat of subse-
quent legislation. Focus initially on the possibility of constraint 
through subsequent legislation that overturns the decision of 
the agent. Note that this legislation requires a unanimous vote 
among H, S and P, as any one of them has the power to block a 
change from the new status quo defined by the agent’s deci-
sion. As an initial cut, the agent then has a free hand to imple-
ment her policy preferences rather than implement with fidelity 
the deal struck among H, S and P. So if the agent’s policy pref-
erences matched more closely, say, P, the agent could imple-
ment a policy that P would find superior to the deal captured in 
the negotiated legislation, and P would veto any subsequent 
legislative effort to overturn the agent’s decision. 
That doesn’t mean that the new status quo would remain, 
but any new law negotiated among H, S and P would need to 
make P better off than he is under the agent’s decision. And in 
the face of that law, the agent could once again refuse to im-
plement the deal negotiated and instead implement her policy 
preferences. Of course, none of this should be lost on H, S and 
P when they negotiate the original law. Again, they will care 
about how the legislation is actually implemented, not the deal 
cut. H, S and P can anticipate bureaucratic drift. If H and S 
know that the agent will deviate from the original statute in the 
direction of P with the agent’s action protected by P’s veto, H 
and S will never make the deal in the first place. A little bit of 
backwards induction goes a long way. 
We quickly see the complexities of having a process in-
volving delegation. The agent can try to implement his own 
agenda, deviating from the original intent, but not enough to 
induce intervention by the principals. Moreover, if H has been 
delegated control over the agent, H can cheat on the agreement 
with HSP and deviate from the original agreement. If a Con-8    February 13, 2007January 25, 2007 
 
gressman wants to try to cheat on the original legislative deal, 
he can do so if he can exert power over his agent. As Landes 
and Posner (1979) argued in their explanation of the role of an 
independent judiciary, the congressman can commit to not 
cheating by relinquishing his power over the agent. At the 
same time, giving up control over the agent means that the 
agent now has freedom to implement her own policy prefer-
ences. Hands-tying at the front-end equals loss of control at the 
back end. If the agent doesn’t face meaningful discipline, why 
should the agent pay much (any?) attention to the statute at all? 
But at the same time, independence means that the agent 
can implement her preferences in the veto zone, that is, the 
spots in the policy space where Congress and the President will 
not agree unanimously to overturn the agent’s decision. And 
the fact will be anticipated by the institutional players who will 
be disadvantaged by the deviation. They will not want inde-
pendence in their agent and will instead want to design controls 
over the agent that make fidelity to the original deal possible. 
That would be true if H, S and P were just seeking to im-
plement their own independent policy preferences, but would 
also be true if we think of the lawmakers as just selling off leg-
islation to the highest bidder (or as having preferences that 
value both legislative outcomes and transfers from legislation 
buyers). H, S and P will also want controls on themselves, at 
least as a group, so that they can ensure that their control over 
the agent doesn’t allow them to cheat on the original deal that 
was cut amongst themselves or with the legislation purchaser. 
After the fact, they would like to cheat, either individually or 
as a group, but that too will be anticipated by the legislation 
purchaser, so H, S and P need a commitment mechanism to 
maximize the amount that they can charge legislation purchas-
ers. 
We can sketch out what such a system might look like. 
Consider a basic public choice model with an interested party Carlton & Picker  Antitrust and Regulation  9 
 
simply purchasing legislation that will be implemented by an 
agent. We can offer H, S and P each some levers of oversight 
over the agent. That may be enough to solve the problem of the 
agent cheating. H needs to have sufficient individual power to 
block moves by the agent away from the original law, and so 
too for S and P. Or we need to make sure that the legislation 
purchaser can exercise oversight powers against H, S and P to 
make sure that they faithfully implement the original deal 
bought and paid for by the legislation purchaser. 
What should our legislation purchaser fear most, cheating 
by the principal or cheating by the agent? Purchasers have little 
control over Article III judges and much more control over 
congressional principals and agency agents. Both of these 
should push the legislation purchaser towards favoring a cap-
tive agency. Legislation purchasers are well-situated to punish 
a member of Congress who cheats on the original deal by im-
posing her will on the agency. Members of Congress run every 
two years (House) or six years (Senate) and are constantly rais-
ing money for reelection (the best way to discourage compet-
ing candidates is to amass a large pile of money). A member 
who cheats on a deal with a legislation purchaser reveals him-
self to be a poor candidate for future deals and future campaign 
contributions. The need to return to the market for campaign 
funds disciplines members of Congress from using their influ-
ence on agents to cheat on the original deal that was cut. In 
contrast, legislation buyers can exercise little indirect or direct 
control over judges, since Congress and the President both lack 
control over Article III judges. 
We should make one other point about this structure. 
Agency decisions are typically subject to appeals to independ-
ent federal judges. That would seem to make the judges the 
ultimate authority but that depends importantly on what judges 
do with agency actions. Under the Supreme Court’s Chevron 
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467 U.S. 837 (1984)), judges give agencies wide-latitude in 
interpreting federal statutes. Not unlimited latitude, but Chev-
ron is a policy of substantial deference to agencies. Chevron 
deference creates an agent largely outside of judicial control, 
and therefore subject to meaningful congressional control. That 
in turn means that Congress and the President can more credi-
bly commit to those seeking legislation by delegating to inde-
pendent agencies than it can to Article III courts. Chevron pre-
serves broad independence for agencies as against the courts—
thereby making them into actors that elected officials can con-
trol—while appeals to courts operate as a hedge against agents 
who have deviated too far from what their principals wanted. 
B. Agent Choice in Antitrust and Regulated Industries 
On July 2, 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act and in so 
doing created a baseline for the control of competition in the 
United States. To the modern eye, the Sherman Act is notable 
for its simultaneous brevity and comprehensiveness. The entire 
statute is set forth in eight sections and barely covers more than 
one page in the Statutes at Large. Section 1 condemned every 
contract in restraint of trade and Section 2 made a criminal of 
every person who monopolized. Consider two questions: 
(1)  Why was the Sherman Act implemented in the federal 
courts, and not through a federal agency?; and (2) Given the 
breadth of the Sherman Act, what else would we need to regu-
late competition? Why doesn’t the Sherman Act suffice, or, 
given our description of the legislative process above, when 
and how should we expect to add new laws regulating competi-
tion? 
1. WHO INITIALLY GETS THE SHERMAN ACT? 
On the first question, a little history may help. At the time that 
the Sherman Act was passed, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was still a baby, a bold experiment in a highly-
specialized but central industry. It would have been a sizeable Carlton & Picker  Antitrust and Regulation  11 
 
leap of faith to apply the same mechanism to the entire econ-
omy. The natural, conservative move was to use the federal 
courts. Moreover, to fast forward twenty-five years to 1914, we 
did make that jump when we created the Federal Trade Com-
mission (more on that at the end of Section III). 
The agency choice literature (Fiorina (1982), Stephenson 
(2005)) compares the relative stability of decision-making in 
agencies and courts. Commissions typically are small and are 
controlled by the party of the President; the President also 
chooses the chair of the commission (this was roughly how the 
ICC worked and is how the FCC and FTC work today). Turn-
over of the presidency means turnover of the Commission. 
Commissions therefore may exhibit high-variance across peri-
ods of time—a Democratic FTC looks different from a Repub-
lican FTC—but greater coherence among related decisions 
made within a particular window. In contrast, the federal courts 
are quite stable over time, but are subject to very little control 
at any point in time. But the sheer number of judges means that 
two contemporaneous decisions may reach quite different out-
comes. 
This helps to explain why in 1887 an agency was a rela-
tively more attractive choice for railroads than it was for the 
general economy. The railroads were the first great network 
industry (we could fight about canals). The nature of a network 
is that regulatory decisions in one part of the network can have 
large effects in other parts of the network. If one regulator sets 
a track gauge of 5 feet, while another sets it at 4 feet, 6 inches, 
the network will operate inefficiently. This was precisely the 
issue in the fierce fight over constitutional protection in rate-
setting for railroads. State regulators were setting low rates for 
intrastate shipments, hoping to keep the railroads solvent on 
the back of interstate rates. The Supreme Court understood that 
fully when it decided Smyth v. Ames in 1898 (169 U.S. 466 12    February 13, 2007January 25, 2007 
 
(1898)) and imposed limits on state rate-making for railroads 
that could be deemed confiscatory. 
But outside of railroads, in the rest of the economy around 
the beginning of the 20
th century, regional inconsistencies in 
industry practices were less important. If the Second Circuit 
reached one antitrust outcome, and the Seventh Circuit another, 
the greater the extent to which economic activity was local or 
regional, the less that these regulatory differences mattered. 
Local (uncoordinated) antitrust enforcement, whether federally 
at the circuit level or by states, was less costly to the economy 
when the economy was a local economy—the 1900s and the 
early 20
th Century—than it is today. 
When many parts in the economic system need to move at 
the same time—when we are speaking of co-evolution, as it 
were, rather than just evolution—it may be very hard for lower 
federal courts to coordinate decision-making, and Supreme 
Court decisions are rare and slow to come. The inefficiency in 
a network industry of having uncoordinated decision-making 
could be very high. Plus courts are passive when it comes to 
agenda-setting: they can only decide the cases that come before 
them. In contrast, agencies expressly control their own agen-
das, subject to the original statute to be sure, but tied down of-
ten by nothing more than a public interest standard. The ability 
to set agendas means that agencies can push forward on all 
parts of the economic system at the same time. Agencies can 
do punctuated equilibria: leaps from one spot to another, while 
courts are normally limited to smaller moves within established 
frameworks. Our logic predicts that as policy concerns with 
competition arise in particular industries, all else being equal, 
network industries are more likely than non-network industries 
to see their competition regulated by agencies, rather than the 
courts. Carlton & Picker  Antitrust and Regulation  13 
 
2. WHEN IS THE SHERMAN ACT NOT THE BEST TOOL FOR COMPETITION 
POLICY IN PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES? 
Once the ICC and Sherman Act were established, how should 
we expect the evolution of competition policy in particular in-
dustries to proceed? Every attempt to control competition after 
1890—whether within antitrust proper or outside of antitrust in 
the form of area-specific regulation—has to be understood in 
the context of the Sherman Act. Given its breadth, we might 
ask why weren’t the antitrust laws sufficient to regulate all in-
dustries? The prevailing—but, to be sure, not universally-
held—view of antitrust law in the U.S. is that it is designed to 
promote efficiency by protecting the competitive process to 
benefit society. Why shouldn’t that be enough? 
As noted in the introduction, antitrust and regulation have 
different comparative advantages. To grossly simplify, while 
both antitrust and regulation are a mix of economics and poli-
tics, antitrust is now organized around an economic core, while 
regulation is frequently shaped by the political process. To 
draw that out, while the decision by the Antitrust Division in 
the Department of Justice or by the Federal Trade Commission 
to bring a case may be influenced by politics, once a case is 
brought, the ultimate decision regarding the case is made by a 
federal judge. 
Federal courts are a poor forum for reflecting democratic 
values. Federal judges are supposed to enforce the law, not 
make political judgments. Judges implementing the Sherman 
Act are poorly situated to make assessments about the “right” 
price or quality for anything, be it a cup of coffee or a kilowatt 
of electricity. Pricing in electricity, for example, will depend 
on our willingness to endure blackouts, and if we think that at 
least parts of the electricity system are a natural monopoly—
the transmission grid itself—the government will almost cer-
tainly be involved in price setting. Judges have little if any 
ability to determine the public’s tolerance for blackouts and we 14    February 13, 2007January 25, 2007 
 
should want that to be determined as part of a political process. 
That means industry-specific regulation and accountable regu-
lators, and not general rules for competition implemented by 
judges separated from democratic forces. 
But we should entrust to the political process only that 
which needs to be there. If we don’t have judges as independ-
ent decision-makers, we have regulators beholden either to the 
industries that they regulate or to other special interests. Com-
petition is diverted from the marketplace to the regulator’s of-
fice, and the tools for success—ranging from subtle influence 
to out-and-out bribery—may be very different. Instead, we 
should regulate only when we must—natural monopoly being 
the core case—and leave general antitrust doctrine and the 
court system to handle the rest. The case of natural monopoly 
initially was often dealt with by explicit price regulation, 
though the optimal form of regulation has evolved over time 
(e.g., price caps) in recognition of the need to create incentives 
for regulated firms to act efficiently. 
C. Antitrust Immunities 
An unregulated industry subject only to the antitrust laws 
might seek an exemption from those laws for one of two rea-
sons. The industry might want to avoid inefficiencies that the 
antitrust laws create. Alternatively, the industry might want to 
avoid the constraints of the antitrust laws and want to engage 
in anticompetitive behavior such as cartelization. Policing that 
line—separating good antitrust immunities from the bad—can 
be tricky. 
In some circumstances, collective action might be required 
to achieve efficiency, but Section 1 flatly forbids any contract 
in restraint of trade. Many R&D and information gathering ac-
tivities, as well as sports leagues organized as joint ventures, 
create a high risk of antitrust liability, as the history of antitrust Carlton & Picker  Antitrust and Regulation  15 
 
cases demonstrates.1 Farmer cooperatives are another example 
in which small firms may be able to achieve some economies 
by collective action but still remain independent firms that 
compete against each other. Often, these collaborative activi-
ties created no market power and only efficiencies but these 
could have faced Sherman Act actions, especially in the early 
days of antitrust. Indeed Bittlingmayer (1985) has argued that 
the Sherman Act created antitrust liability for cooperative ac-
tivities among horizontal competitors and thereby encouraged 
the massive merger wave around 1900. 
We may be able to solve this problem within antitrust 
proper through careful development of doctrine, but beneficial 
activity that is close to the antitrust line risks treble damages. 
Plus firms face individual liability if they end up on the wrong 
side of the line, while an improvement in antitrust doctrine 
benefits the industry as a whole. This mismatch between pri-
vate costs and industry benefits means that for a particular in-
dustry, exemption from antitrust might be easier to implement 
than internal reform of antitrust doctrine through the courts. 
Antitrust immunities also serve a channeling function for 
activities to influence competition policy. Absent the immu-
nity, activity that influences competition policy takes place in 
the courts, before the Federal Trade Commission, and in Con-
gress through the pursuit of new legislation. Immunity chan-
nels this competition, mainly to Congress. We can think of an-
titrust immunity as a commitment about how the policy game 
will be played, a commitment about where the next move will 
be made. It means that courts and agencies don’t get to move, 
and that instead the next move will be made by the legislature, 
though, of course, that could be a future legislature, rather than 
the current legislature. 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 
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But there, of course, is a more pernicious reason that we 
should expect exemptions to our competition law: interest 
groups pursue benefits from legislatures and many of those 
benefits take the form of legislation. Firms may want to cartel-
ize an industry to reap profits. The Sherman Act would block 
that, hence an exemption from antitrust might be required. But 
exemption may not be enough for the serious cartelizer: a car-
tel cannot succeed in raising price unless entry can be re-
stricted. With free entry it does little good to obtain an antitrust 
exemption. 
We therefore expect that where an interest group is power-
ful but cannot control entry it will combine an antitrust exemp-
tion with legislation that restricts entry (or just have the entry 
restriction built into the legislation through a tariff or licensing 
restriction). Failing that, the industry may prefer regulation to 
competition, with the regulator controlling entry and perhaps 
price. But as we know from the theory of political regulation, 
there are many interest groups that will have a voice in the 
regulatory process. Different groups of consumers and firms 
will have their own interests and compromises amongst them 
will be up to the regulator. It is unusual for a regulator to favor 
one group to the exclusion of all others, as Peltzman (1976) 
especially has shown (see also Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), 
and Becker (1983)). Therefore, a very powerful interest group 
would obtain exemption with legislative entry restrictions, 
rather than regulation. 
There are many important parts of the economy which have 
received exemptions from the antitrust laws. The major areas 
are: 
•  Agriculture and Fishing. The exemption allows co-
operatives to form and even have joint marketing. 
Section 6 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 17) pro-
tected certain labor, agricultural and horticultural 
organizations and the 1922 Capper-Volstead Act (7 Carlton & Picker  Antitrust and Regulation  17 
 
U.S.C. §§ 291-292) addressed joint marketing asso-
ciations. Section 1 of the Sherman Act is odd in that 
it does not allow two firms, each with no market 
power, to set price, even though together they have 
no ability to raise price. The per se treatment of 
such price fixing is presumably justified by the be-
lief that such price setting can have no procompeti-
tive purpose. One consequence of such a rule, espe-
cially when the interpretation of antitrust was un-
clear, was to promote mergers (Bittlingmayer 
(1985)). Another is for the industry to receive an 
antitrust exemption. 
•  R&D Joint Ventures. Similar to the case of agricul-
tural cooperatives, the cooperation of rivals to 
achieve efficiencies in R&D can raise antitrust is-
sues. Under the National Cooperative Research Act 
of 1984 (15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306) certain of those 
activities are exempt from challenge as per se ille-
gal and antitrust’s treble damage rule is called off. 
•  Sports Leagues. Sport leagues consist of competing 
teams that must cooperate in order to have a viable 
league. There have been numerous antitrust cases in 
sports because of the peculiar combination of com-
petition and cooperation needed for a successful 
league. Today sports leagues often start as a sepa-
rate single firm so as to avoid antitrust challenge. 
When Curt Flood sued baseball commissioner 
Bowie Kuhn to try to end baseball’s reserve clause, 
the Supreme Court confirmed that the antitrust laws 
did not apply to baseball (though they apply to 
other sports) (Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)). 
The Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (15 U.S.C. 
§ 1291) allows leagues to act as one entity in nego-
tiations with the media without antitrust liability. 18    February 13, 2007January 25, 2007 
 
•  Ocean Shipping. International cartels set rates for 
certain ocean shipping routes. Entry is not typically 
controlled, though on some routes entry is unlikely. 
The industry’s antitrust exemption (46 U.S.C. 
§ 1706) is sometimes defended (Pirrong (1992)) on 
the grounds that the core does not exist and that, 
without the cartel, chaos would reign with frequent 
bankruptcies and unreliable service. 
•  Webb-Pomerene. Added in 1918, this act allows 
cartels to set the price for exports, presumably on 
the logic that the antitrust laws do not protect for-
eign consumers (15 U.S.C. § 61). 
•  Colleges. In response to an antitrust suit alleging 
that the top colleges agreed on a financial aid for-
mula to use to give out scholarship aid, Congress 
passed the Higher Education Amendments of 1992 
(Pub.L. 102-235) to allow colleges to agree on a 
common formula for financial aid free of possible 
antitrust liability without allowing colleges to dis-
cuss aid for any particular applicant. 
•  Professional Societies. Many societies such as those 
involving doctors and lawyers have the ability to in-
fluence entry into their profession. Although Pro-
fessional Engineers (435 U.S. 679 (1978)) has lim-
ited the scope of the exemption, it is still the case 
for example that medical societies control the num-
ber of doctors by specialty and limit the number of 
medical schools that can receive accreditation. The 
professional societies are given this exemption be-
cause they are also regulating the quality of the pro-
fession. In a recent antitrust attack on parts of the 
medical profession, a group of residents brought an 
antitrust suit aimed at the medical schools, teaching 
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residency system. In that system, doctors seeking 
advanced training are assigned one hospital to work 
at. There is limited competition for the resident. 
Legislation (Section 207 of the Pension Funding 
Equity Act of 2004 (Pub. L. 108-218)) was passed 
to declare that no antitrust liability results from the 
administration of the medical residency system, but 
the original litigation continues. 
•  Labor. Unfavorable court decisions led eventually 
to the labor exemption. In 1908, the Supreme Court 
found a union liable under the antitrust laws for or-
ganizing a boycott of a particular firm’s product 
(Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908)). This deci-
sion caused labor to pressure Congress to declare in 
1914 in the Clayton Act that labor organizations 
were exempt from the antitrust laws. A subsequent 
decision (Duplex Printing Company v. Deering, 254 
U.S. 433 (1920)) found that the unions could still be 
liable if they assisted other unions at another firm. 
This led to pressure to pass the Norris-La Guardia 
Act in 1932 which removed virtually all jurisdiction 
over labor from the federal courts (Benson et al. 
(1987)).2 
                                                 
2 This pattern of legislation and antitrust interacting, and specifically an antitrust 
case being a stimulus for either immunity or regulation applies also to other indus-
tries that we do not discuss herein. For example, the Southeastern Underwriters case 
(322 U.S. 533 (1944)) found that insurance companies had antitrust liability for rate 
agreements even in states that regulated rates. This discussion led to the passage of 
the McCarron-Ferguson Act, granting antitrust immunity where states regulated 
insurance. Similarly, Otter Tail (410 U.S. 366 (1973)) found antitrust liability for an 
electric utility company for failure to interconnect with another utility even though 
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) could order such interconnection. The Court 
ruled that the FPC’s powers were too limited. This decision led to legislation giving 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the renamed FPC) greater powers to 
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As a mechanism to establish an efficient competition policy, 
the use of immunities may be socially desirable in those in-
stances where some collective action is needed for efficiency. 
Although some immunities may be described that way, others 
confer market power on the exempted industries to the detri-
ment of society.  
II. Control over Rates: The Rise of Antitrust and the Regu-
lation of Railroads 
We return to the early period of antitrust and regulation be-
cause it illustrates the interaction between explicit regulation 
and the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act was passed three years 
after the Commerce Act. The interaction between the two and 
the results of that interaction not only illustrate the economic 
forces at work that we have discussed, but also have shaped the 
subsequent development of competition policy for the century. 
The history highlights the early view of regulation and antitrust 
as substitutes for each other with a recognition that the two 
might interact through unforeseen ways. 
The Interstate Commerce Act was adopted on February 4, 
1887. The new law addressed the operation of interstate rail-
roads and limited rates to those that were “reasonable and 
just.” The statute barred more general “unjust discrimination” 
and “undue or unreasonable preferences,” and made unlawful 
long-haul/short-haul discrimination. The act also addressed 
directly competition among railroads by barring contracts 
among competing railroads for the pooling of freight traffic. 
Pools dividing freight and profit had been common before 
the passage of the Commerce Act and indeed had been created 
openly in an effort to control competition among railroads 
(Grodinsky (1950)). The structure of the railroad business prior 
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rates through cartels and pools (Hilton (1966)). The number of 
railroads competing on a particular route was usually small and 
fixed costs were high. The former meant that the costs of 
agreeing and monitoring that agreement were relatively low. 
The irreversibility of the investments in the track meant that 
competitors were locked into place and couldn’t exit if the 
level of demand wouldn’t support multiple competitors. Absent 
cartels, the incentive to have rate wars was great. 
We can think of the initial regulation of railroads as a 
search for an institutional structure that protected shippers from 
monopoly power and discrimination while making it possible 
for railroad investors to earn competitive rates of return. The 
Interstate Commerce Act limited competition among railroads, 
while also protecting local shippers against perceived discrimi-
nation in rates. (Whether this was a net plus or minus for the 
railroads is an issue we do not address here—for a discussion 
of this issue see Gilligan, Marshall & Weingast (1989)). The 
Sherman Act was passed three years after the Commerce Act, 
without a clear indication of how the two Acts should interact. 
We now turn to that interaction and its consequences. 
A. The Interaction of the Sherman Act with the Interstate Com-
merce Act—The Problem of Trans-Missouri 
The Sherman Act said nothing specific about railroads. Did the 
Sherman Act cover railroads, too, or should we think that the 
more specific, if somewhat earlier, provisions of the Interstate 
Commerce Act controlled? These questions were posed to the 
courts in January, 1892, when the United States brought an ac-
tion to dissolve the Trans-Missouri Freight Association. The 
Trans-Missouri Association had been formed in March of 1889 
as a joint rate-setting organization. While Section 5 of the In-
terstate Commerce Act barred contracts regarding pooling of 
freight or division of profits, it said nothing about rate-setting 
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agreement with the ICC as required by Section 6 of the Com-
merce Act. 
The Supreme Court decided Trans-Missouri on March 22, 
1897. In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected both the idea that 
railroads were somehow exempt from the Sherman Act given 
the more direct regulatory structure set forth in the Commerce 
Act and that the Sherman Act condemned only unreasonable 
restraints of trade. Understanding the language of the Sherman 
Act to have meant what it “plainly imports”—condemning all 
restraints of trade—the Court condemned the private rate-
setting of the railroad association and squarely inserted the 
Sherman Act into the everyday economic life of the country. 
Where did that leave rate-setting for railroads? Two months 
later, on May 24, 1897, the Court announced its opinion in 
Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway (167 U.S. 
479 (1897)). That case considered whether the ICC had the 
power to set rates. Yes, the Commerce Act required rates to be 
“reasonable and just” and declared unreasonable and unjust 
rates unlawful. Yes, the Interstate Commerce Commission was 
to enforce the act, but the statute only expressly authorized the 
commission to issue a cease-and-desist order. The Supreme 
Court held that the ICC could do no more than that and that the 
ICC lacked the affirmative power to set rates. The power to set 
rates, said the Court, was “a legislative, and not an administra-
tive or judicial, function” and given the stakes, that meant that 
“Congress has transferred such a power to any administrative 
body is not to be presumed or implied from any doubtful and 
uncertain language.” 
So Trans-Missouri turned private collective railroad rate-
setting into an antitrust violation, and under the Cincinnati rul-
ing, the ICC could do no more than reject rates. Where would 
rate-setting authority lie? The Sherman Act was to be enforced 
in the courts, and through its decisions, the Supreme Court had 
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Trans-Missouri decision dominated railroad and antitrust pol-
icy for the next decade; at another level, the decision was 
largely irrelevant. As to the latter, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission stated in its 1901 Annual Report: 
It is not the businesses of this Commission to en-
force the anti-trust act, and we express no opinion 
as to the legality of the means adopted by these as-
sociations. We simply call attention to the fact that 
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
the Trans-Missouri case and the Joint Traffic Asso-
ciation case has produced no practical effect upon 
the railway operations of the country. Such associa-
tions, in fact, exist now as they did before those de-
cisions, and with the same general effect. In justice 
to all parties we ought probably to add that it is dif-
ficult to see how our interstate railways could be 
operated, with due regard to the interests of the 
shipper and the railway, without concerted action of 
the kind afforded to these associations. 
But in another way, the Trans-Missouri decision framed the 
country’s consideration of the trust question and the related 
question of how to grapple with large agglomerations of capi-
tal, as Sklar (1988) demonstrates in his history of the period. 
This decision seemingly satisfied no one. 
B. Solving Trans-Missouri 
If the ICC was right—if the economic structure of railroads 
required coordinated rate-setting, either privately or through 
the government—the path forward was through revised legisla-
tion. Theodore Roosevelt had become president when 
McKinley was assassinated in September 1901. In February 
1903, Roosevelt moved forward on two fronts. The Elkins Act 
of 1903 gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the inde-
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which railroads were charging less than published rates or were 
engaging in forbidden discrimination. Under the original 
Commerce Act, the ICC could act only on the petition of an 
injured party. The Elkins Act increased the ICC’s power, but it 
still didn’t have an independent rate-setting power. Three years 
later, the Hepburn Act of 1906 took a first step in that direc-
tion. It added oil pipelines to the substantive scope of the act, 
and gave the ICC the power to set maximum rates, once it had 
found a prior rate unjust and unreasonable. 
But Roosevelt, unwilling to rely solely on the Sherman Act 
to control general competition policy, was also looking for a 
way to exert more regulatory pressure on the rest of the econ-
omy. On February 14, 1903, Congress created a new executive 
department to be known as the Department of Commerce and 
Labor. Within the new department, the statute created the Bu-
reau of Corporations. The bureau was designed to be an inves-
tigatory body with power to subpoena whose mission was to 
investigate any corporation engaged in interstate commerce to 
produce information and recommendations for legislation. But 
all of this information was to flow through the President who in 
turn had the power to release industries from scrutiny. Rail-
roads were expressly excluded. The design of the Bureau of 
Corporations matched Roosevelt’s conception of the presi-
dency as the bully pulpit. The bureau would give Roosevelt the 
information that he needed to go to the public or to Congress, 
plus the fact that the release of the information was within 
Roosevelt’s power gave Roosevelt leverage in negotiations 
with corporations. 
After winning the presidency in 1906, Roosevelt continued 
to pursue his progressive agenda. Roosevelt called for an ex-
pansion of federal control over railroads—greater control over 
entry and issuance of securities, while allowing private railroad 
agreements on rates subject to approval by the Interstate Com-
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broad expansion in federal powers over large corporations en-
gaged in interstate activities. He called for a federal incorpora-
tion law, or a federal licensing act, or some combination of the 
two. But by 1909, the Hepburn Bill, Roosevelt’s vehicle for 
these changes, was dead in committee, and with it died Roose-
velt’s attempt for greater direct federal regulation of competi-
tion policy. 
William Howard Taft succeeded Roosevelt as President in 
1909. Taft supported the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, which cre-
ated a new, limited-subject matter jurisdiction court, the United 
States Court of Commerce. It was staffed with five judges from 
the federal judiciary. The new Commerce Court was given ex-
clusive jurisdiction of all appeals from ICC orders and appeals 
from the Commerce Court went to the Supreme Court. 
Consider the Commerce Court in light of our prior general 
analysis of the choice between agencies and courts. Our dis-
cussion above suggested that federal courts of general 
jurisdiction would be poorly situated to deal with network 
industries. As Frankfurter and Landis (1928, p. 154) 
recognized, federal courts of general jurisdiction resulted in 
“conflicts in court decisions begetting territorial diversity 
where unified treatment of a problem is demanded, 
nullification by a single judge, even temporarily, of legislative 
or administrative action affecting whole sections of the coun-
try.” A federal court of specialized jurisdiction would make 
possible many of the benefits of agencies—in particular, the 
ability to make coherent, contemporaneous decisions—while 
creating more independence than an agency would have. 
The new Commerce Court took over a large number of 
cases then spread throughout the federal judiciary. The court 
was instantly busy and, almost as quickly, reviled by the public 
(Ripley, 1910). The Commerce Court became the flashpoint for 
the “railroad problem”; as Frankfurter and Landis (1928, 
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adjudicate so large a volume of litigation of as far-reaching 
import in so brief a time.” 
The Commerce Court failed. The public saw the ICC as 
protecting shoppers from the power of the railroads, while the 
Commerce Court frequently overturned ICC decisions to the 
detriment of shippers. As Kolko (1965, p. 199) puts it in de-
scribing a series of Commerce Court decisions that were seen 
to benefit the railroads, “… the Commerce Court proceeded to 
make itself the most unpopular judicial institution in a nation 
then in the process of attacking the sanctity of the courts.” 
When Woodrow Wilson became President, he quickly signed 
legislation ending the Commerce Court, which came to final 
death on December 31, 1913. Its demise illustrates the power 
of shippers to protect themselves in ways that antitrust could 
not. 
Wilson’s presidency brings the process of structural reform 
to a close. The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil 
had already muted some of the pressure for antitrust reform. 
That decision abandoned the literalism of Trans-Missouri and 
introduced (restored?) the common law distinction between 
reasonable and unreasonable restraints of trade. (And, by the 
way, also broke up Standard Oil.) Early in his first term, on 
January 20, 1914, Wilson delivered a special message to Con-
gress on antitrust. Wilson had two principal aims. First he 
wanted to make explicit the nature of antitrust violations: 
Surely we are sufficiently familiar with the actual 
processes and methods of monopoly and of the 
many hurtful restraints of trade to make definition 
possible—at any rate up to the limits of what prac-
tice has disclosed. These practices, being now abun-
dantly disclosed, can be explicitly and item by item 
forbidden by statute in such terms as will practically 
eliminate uncertainty, the law itself and the penalty 
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Wilson then turned to the idea of an interstate trade com-
mission: 
And the businessman of the country desire some-
thing more than that the menace of legal process in 
these matters be made explicit and intelligible. They 
desire the advice, the definite guidance and infor-
mation which can be supplied by administrative 
body, an interstate trade commission. 
Later that year, Wilson got exactly what he wanted with the 
enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) and 
the Clayton Act. Adopted on September 26, 1914, the FTCA 
brought to a close Roosevelt’s efforts to extend the Interstate 
Commerce Act to the general economy. The Bureau of Corpo-
rations, designed by Roosevelt as the President’s private inves-
tigatory arm, was to become the back-office of the new Federal 
Trade Commission. The Commission itself was to parallel the 
Interstate Commerce Commission: an independent agency of 
five commissioners appointed by the President on the advice 
and consent of the Senate. 
Section 5 of the FTCA declared unlawful “unfair methods 
of competition” and empowered the FTC to prevent the use of 
such methods other than by banks, subject to the new banking 
act, and common carriers subject to the Commerce Act. In so 
doing, Section 5 tracked the Commerce Act in two ways: the 
FTCA focused on unfairness—typically measured by compar-
ing the treatment of two similarly situated market partici-
pants—while denying broader rate-setting power to the FTC. 
And the Clayton Act forbade specific practices, including tying 
and price discrimination. So Wilson got the specificity he 
wanted through the Clayton Act, and a general regulatory 
agency devoted to all industry through his new Federal Trade 
Commission. Industry would have a regulatory agency that it 
could turn to and perhaps even influence. The FTC, unlike in-
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eral. Perhaps this explains why, at least today, we are unaware 
of claims that the FTC has been captured by any industry or 
special interest group. Its structure raises the issue as to 
whether a combination of antitrust and industry-specific regu-
lation in one agency, as occurs today in Australia or Europe for 
certain functions, is desirable—an issue we leave for future 
research. 
*** 
With the 1914 legislation, the key institutional features that 
still dominate U.S. antitrust law were established: the Sherman 
Act, the Clayton Act, and the FTC Act. The balance between 
antitrust and regulation still had to be worked out. The resolu-
tion of the issue of Trans-Missouri still would take some time. 
The Transportation Act of 1920—finally—gave the Interstate 
Commerce Commission full control over rates, requiring the 
Commission to ensure that rates permitted carriers to receive “a 
fair return upon the aggregate value of the railway property of 
such carriers held for and used in the service of transportation.” 
As to the fight over whether antitrust or regulation ultimately 
controlled rate setting for railroads, in 1948, more than a half-
century after the Supreme Court’s original decision in Trans-
Missouri, Congress finally put the decision to rest by exempt-
ing joint setting of railroad rates from the antitrust laws, so 
long as the ICC approved the rates.3 
III. Interconnection in Network Industries 
We now jump from the formative years of the creation of com-
petition policy to more recent times. Just as the initial battles 
between regulation and the Sherman Act illustrate the battle 
between antitrust and regulation as two methods to control 
competition, so too do more recent events—particularly the 
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recent shift away from regulation to reliance on the Sherman 
Act. We focus our attention on network industries, since those 
are the ones where the case for regulation was often thought to 
be the strongest. If rate-setting was the first great issue of com-
petition policy for network industries, the leading issue today is 
interconnection and mandatory access.4 
This recent history highlights a move away from regulation 
towards antitrust as a means to control competition and reveals 
how regulation and antitrust can be both substitutes and, in 
some settings, complements. The substitution involves the 
complete replacement of regulation with antitrust, as occurs 
when industries become deregulated (e.g., airlines and trucks). 
The complementarity between regulation and antitrust can arise 
in two ways. In an industry that becomes partially deregulated, 
antitrust can be used to control the unregulated segments, while 
regulation controls the rest. Indeed, partial deregulation of an 
industry can increase the importance to a rival’s survival of 
rules of interconnection. 
In structuring an efficient partial deregulation of an indus-
try, the assignment of tasks to antitrust versus regulation is key. 
We shouldn’t ask antitrust and federal judges to perform tasks 
for which they are ill-suited—namely price setting and crafting 
affirmative duties because those tasks require specialized in-
dustry knowledge that judges lack. If we need government in-
volvement in those tasks, they should be assigned to regulators 
with specialized industry knowledge, though in making that 
judgment we need to recognize the inefficiencies that can arise 
as regulators cater to special interests or make mistakes. That is 
an especially strong problem in industries undergoing rapid 
technological change, where mistakes can impose huge costs. 
                                                 
4 The issue of interconnection is much more general than the text indicates because 
it applies to any industry (not just network industries) in which one firm relies on a 
rival for an input or in which a rival can influence the conditions of the input supply 
of another firm. The Microsoft case provides a good illustration.  30    February 13, 2007January 25, 2007 
 
But it may be a mistake to just trump antitrust entirely, as we 
should fear capture of regulators, and that leads to a second 
type of complementarity. 
The second form of complementarity between antitrust and 
regulation involves the use of antitrust as a constraint on how 
regulation is implemented. This is often implemented through a 
double filter or double-veto process, as we see in telecommu-
nications mergers. The FCC evaluates telecom mergers under a 
public interest standard and that empowers the FCC to consider 
a wider range of issues than we typically entrust to federal 
judges. This would include, for example, whether and how to 
implement cross-subsidies. But given the fear of regulatory 
capture, we apply a second, antitrust filter to these mergers by 
allowing the Department of Justice to sue under the antitrust 
laws to block an anticompetitive merger that the FCC has ap-
proved. Exactly how much scrutiny should be applied to regu-
latory decisions turns on a trade-off between allowing expertise 
to work—FCC expertise and knowledge—versus fearing bi-
ased decision-making from an agency subject to capture. Even 
if no antitrust suit occurs, the threat of such a suit can influence 
FCC policy. 
In this section, we address the fundamental question that 
has occupied and continues to occupy regulatory and antitrust 
decisions in network industries: how should those markets be 
structured and specifically how should firms interact in those 
industries? We focus our analysis on telecommunications and 
transportation (planes, trains and trucks), though we note that 
interconnection issues are important in other industries such as 
electricity, where generators must have access to the transmis-
sion grid.  
As already explained, a regulation may allow elevated pric-
ing in return for some other objective that the regulator is 
likely to have to satisfy, such as a cross subsidy to different 
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regulator may need to also control entry. Otherwise there may 
be no way to maintain the elevated price. This means that the 
regulator wants to limit competition and for that reason will be 
hostile to being constrained by the antitrust laws. 
The regulators’ concern with entry is especially acute in 
network industries in which firms must interconnect with each 
other, such as airlines, trucking, electricity, railroads, and tele-
communications. In such industries, the regulator needs to ad-
minister the price and quality of the interconnection. If two 
firms compete in the end market and one competitor supplies 
the other a key input, the regulator must worry that the supplier 
will misuse its control over the input to harm his rival. This 
concern vanishes if the regulated firms are not allowed to ver-
tically integrate. In the absence of regulation, competition 
would likely lead to massive vertical and horizontal merger and 
a concentrated market structure. In contrast, regulation should 
lead to many vertically disintegrated firms. (See Carlton and 
Klamer (1983)). 
Moreover when regulated firms must interconnect, the 
price of interconnection will typically be regulated to be above 
marginal cost. If so, there will be an efficiency motivation for a 
firm to vertically integrate to avoid double marginalization. 
But such mergers would eliminate firms and ultimately lead to 
one firm. Regulators might prefer to avoid this outcome to pre-
vent one firm from becoming a potent political force in regula-
tory battles.5 By observing what happens when regulations are 
lifted, we can get a sense for why it was important for the regu-
lators to constrain the forces of competition. We look at a few 
regulated network industries below. They all show a similar 
                                                 
5 In an industry with high sunk costs but low marginal costs, interconnection fees 
based on models of contestability fail to reward carriers adequately for risk, since 
contestability ignores sunk costs. In such situations, not only is price above mar-
ginal cost, but investment is deterred. This may have been the case in telecommuni-
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pattern: after either partial or complete deregulation, there is 
massive consolidation, increased industry concentration, an 
end to cross subsidy, often a decline in employment or wages, 
and a fall in price. Deregulation can be seen as the result of a 
consensus that regulation imposed high costs on the economy 
and that courts are sensibly applying the antitrust laws. Indeed, 
there is a recognition that the use of economics has revolution-
ized and made more sensible the antitrust laws.6 In light of the 
costs of regulation and the improvement in antitrust, a move-
ment away from regulation towards antitrust has occurred. In 
this view, regulation and antitrust are substitutes. But in some 
cases we also see regulation and antitrust being used together 
in an industry, illustrating the possible complementarity use of 
the two. 
A. Telecommunications 
1. EARLY INTERCONNECTION BATTLES 
The telephone system is about interconnection, as a single-
phone phone system is worthless. In the early days of the in-
dustry, as Mueller (1997) describes, different local companies 
competed with each other. A customer of one company could 
reach other customers of only that company; you might need to 
have multiple phones to reach everyone. (This is very much 
like instant messaging today, where America Online has re-
sisted attempts by Yahoo, Microsoft and others to create a uni-
fied IM system.) American Telephone and Telegraph—the Bell 
System—was the dominant firm of the day, but local competi-
tion was widespread; indeed, during the early 1900s, half of the 
                                                 
6 As Posner (2003) explains in the preface to the second edition of his primer Anti-
trust Law: 
Much of antitrust law in 1976 was an intellectual disgrace. Today, anti-
trust law is a body of economically rational principles largely though not 
entirely congruent with the principles set forth in the first edition. The 
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cities with populations larger than 5,000 had competing local 
firms (Mueller, p. 81). This competition almost certainly had 
benefits—on price and service—but came with a loss of net-
work externalities. AT&T set out to build a universal system 
and started by purchasing competing telephone companies. 
In 1912, that led to an antitrust suit in Portland, Oregon and 
to calls by the Postmaster General to nationalize the telephone 
and telegraph system—presumably to unify the messaging sys-
tems of the day (postal, telegraph and phone) into one set of 
hands. Faced with these two threats, AT&T agreed to, in the 
words of N.C. Kingsbury, an AT&T vice-president, to “set its 
house in order.” In what is now known as the Kingsbury 
Commitment, AT&T agreed to divest itself of control over 
Western Union; to stop acquisitions of competing lines; and to 
give access to Bell’s long distance lines to competing local 
phone companies, that is, to interconnect the Bell system’s 
long distance lines with the local competitor’s network.7 
The Kingsbury Commitment might be framed as a victory 
for local phone competition but for two factors. First, few 
phone users made long-distance calls, so the local line/long-
distance line interconnection may not have been an important 
competitive factor. Second, the size of the local network did 
matter, and AT&T aggressively moved forward on local inter-
connection, something outside the scope of the Kingsbury 
Commitment. 
As is so often the case, antitrust action—here the settle-
ment—sets the stage for the next round of legislation and that 
emerged in the form of the Willis-Graham Act of 1921. The 
new law entrusted telephone mergers to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission and authorized approval if doing so would 
“be of advantage to the persons to whom service is rendered 
                                                 
7 See “Government Accepts an Offer of Complete Separation,” New York Times, 
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and in the public interest.” The Act also displaced the antitrust 
laws: once the ICC had said yes, the Department of Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commission could do nothing. With the new 
act in place, AT&T moved swiftly to create local interconnec-
tion through acquisition, with the ICC approving 271 of 274 
AT&T acquisitions over a thirteen-year period (Starr, 2004, p. 
209). 
2. INTERCONNECTION AGAIN: MCI’S ENTRY INTO LONG DISTANCE 
We jump ahead to consider the entry of MCI into long dis-
tance. We start with a single integrated phone system, with lo-
cal and long-distance controlled by AT&T. MCI entered in a 
very limited way, by building microwave towers to enable pri-
vate within-firm phone calls between St. Louis and Chicago 
(say between Walgreens’s home office in Chicago and a dis-
trict office in St. Louis). MCI didn’t need access to the public 
network to make this work. Even this limited entry required an 
initial 1959 order and a subsequent 1969 ruling from the Fed-
eral Communications Commission. 
Unlike entry into private lines, entry into the public market 
for long distance required MCI to interconnect with AT&T, or 
in the alternative, simultaneous entry by MCI into local and 
long-distance. And if MCI had been forced to build the entire 
network, it could not likely have entered the market. The local 
network was seen as a natural monopoly. It clearly would have 
been inefficient to build a second local network—that just says 
again that the local network was a natural monopoly—and it 
was also probably the case that it was a money-losing proposi-
tion for MCI to build a local network. 
Bundling entry—forcing MCI to enter on the scale of hav-
ing to build a local network if it wanted to enter the long-
distance business—would probably have prevented the long-
distance entry. Unbundling entry—giving MCI access to the 
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meant that MCI could just compare the much more limited 
capital costs of building the second piece with the profits asso-
ciated with that piece rather than the costs of both pieces with 
the profits associated with both pieces. 
MCI moved against AT&T on both regulatory and antitrust 
fronts. In 1970, the FCC had concluded that some entry was 
appropriate, but when push came to shove, the FCC back-
tracked. In February 1978, the FCC rejected MCI’s request that 
AT&T be ordered to provide local physical interconnections 
for MCI’s intended public long-distance service. AT&T suc-
cessfully persuaded the FCC that MCI would target high-profit 
routes and that that would destabilize the existing structure of 
rates, contrary to the public interest. MCI successfully ap-
pealed to the D.C. Circuit, which concluded that the conse-
quences of entry could be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. In 
a subsequent proceeding, in 1978, the D.C. Circuit ordered 
AT&T to make interconnection for MCI’s long-distance ser-
vice. 
MCI filed a private antitrust suit against AT&T in 1974. 
That case eventually went to a jury trial in the first half of 
1980. The jury ultimately found AT&T liable on ten of fifteen 
charges, and awarded $600 million in actual damages, then 
trebled to $1.8 billion under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. On 
interconnection, MCI successfully argued that AT&T’s refusal 
to interconnect constituted an impermissible refusal of access 
to an essential facility. The Seventh Circuit sustained the jury 
finding that that refusal constituted monopolization in violation 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
We should step back from the details of this fight over en-
try and interconnection to focus on the interaction between 
regulation and antitrust. In general we know that regulation can 
lead to cross subsidy. Cross subsidies create entry incentives. 
General antitrust law will often facilitate entry but will do so 
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long distance probably fits in this framework. The D.C. Circuit 
expressly considered the cross-subsidy issues as part of its re-
view of the FCC’s regulatory proceedings, but concluded that 
those issues could be dealt with in subsequent proceedings. In 
contrast, the Seventh Circuit, faced with antitrust claims (and 
not regulatory claims) couldn’t consider what its interconnec-
tion ruling might mean for the existing set of cross-subsidized 
rates. This is an excellent illustration of the use of antitrust in a 
regulated industry to control competition, where antitrust con-
strains what regulation can do. 
Whether we should have welcomed MCI’s entry is a sepa-
rate question. To assess that, we need to assess what goals the 
regulators were pursuing and if those goals were sensible. 
MCI’s entry precipitated a decline in long distance rates. If 
prior to that decline, the regulators were pursuing the “public 
interest,” then MCI’s entry constrained the regulators from 
pursuing their desired policy. If we start with a regulated mo-
nopolist offering services to different customers, the regulator 
will need to set prices for each group of customers. The stan-
dard response in theory is Ramsey pricing. The regulator sets a 
series of prices—prices for long distance and for local service, 
for business customers and consumers, for urban and rural us-
ers—to minimize social loss while hitting a revenue target. The 
Ramsey approach is about allocating the fixed costs of produc-
tion among the different groups using the service. The simple 
theory says that inelastic demanders should pay a larger share 
of the fixed costs. Inelastic demanders won’t change their pur-
chases much in the face of higher charges, and it is the reduced 
consumption when we push prices above marginal cost that 
causes the social loss. So elastic demanders should not bear too 
many fixed costs, inelastic demanders should pay a big chunk 
of those costs. 
Now assume that we have put Ramsey prices into place. 
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whole vision behind Ramsey pricing is that inelastic deman-
ders bear the brunt of fixed costs, while elastic demanders bear 
few of those costs. Ramsey pricing is precisely about price dis-
crimination. If the regulators got the prices “right” in the first 
instance, entry that emerges because of regulator-created price 
gaps that get eliminated by the entry, is entry we do not want if 
we accept the regulators’ goals. This concern with “cream 
skimming” was prevalent in contemplating long-distance entry. 
The regulators may not have implemented Ramsey prices 
in the first instance, but they clearly had created an elaborate 
pattern of cross-subsidies, and that pattern would become more 
difficult to sustain after entry. How should we evaluate entry, 
whether facilities-based competition or otherwise, where the 
entry opportunity is created by cross-subsidy driven pricing? 
To some extent, this requires a political account—a public 
choice account—about the nature of subsidies. If we thought 
that the subsidies were appropriate, then we should bar entry 
occurring just because of the opportunity created by the cross 
subsidy. So if the incumbent charges a higher price in urban 
areas than costs would warrant but does so because of a re-
quirement that the price structure force urban users to subsidize 
rural users, entry targeted at urban users should be seen as 
problematic. In contrast, if we think of cross-subsidies as inap-
propriate, entry may be useful in that it may make those subsi-
dies unsustainable.  
3. THE 1996 ACT’S INTERCONNECTION RULES AND TRINKO8 
With the rise of AT&T’s dominance, despite the passage of the 
Communications Act of 1934, antitrust became the main vehi-
cle for altering the structure of AT&T. In 1949, the federal 
government brought an antitrust action against AT&T, which, 
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in turn, resulted in a 1956 consent decree and final judgment. 
In 1974, the government brought a new action against AT&T, 
and in 1982, a new consent decree emerged as a modification 
of the 1956 decree. That decree resulted in the break up of 
AT&T: long-distance was separated from local and regional 
local companies were established. (Though we will not discuss 
it, the break-up of AT&T has received much attention. See 
Noll and Owen (1989).) 
We want to focus on the next important event, namely the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The 1996 Act is wide-
ranging but we address only its efforts to produce local compe-
tition through interconnection policy and focus on the interac-
tion of antitrust and regulation. The 1996 Act seeks to facilitate 
competition in local telephone markets by making it easier for 
entrants to compete with incumbents. It does so by creating a 
series of mandatory dealing obligations, that is, ways in which 
the incumbent is required to share its facilities with an entrant. 
This includes an obligation of interconnection; a requirement 
to sell telecommunications services to an entrant at wholesale 
prices, so that the entrant can resell those services at retail; and 
an obligation to unbundle its local network and sell access to 
pieces of the network at a cost-based price. 
As to the intersection of the 1996 Act and antitrust, the 
1996 Act contains a “savings” clause: 
Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this 
Act ... shall be construed to modify, impair, or su-
persede the applicability of any of the antitrust 
laws. (47 U.S.C. § 152, Historical and Statutory 
Notes.) 
In January 2004, the Supreme Court announced its opinion 
in Trinko. AT&T wanted to enter Verizon’s local markets in 
New York and sought access pursuant to the terms of the then-
applicable rules under the 1996 Act. When the access granted 
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regulators acted and monetary penalties were imposed against 
Verizon. Enter Curtis Trinko, a New York lawyer. He brought 
an antitrust class action against Verizon alleging that, as a local 
customer of AT&T, he was injured by Verizon’s actions and 
that those actions violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The 
federal district court would have none of that and booted the 
complaint, but the Second Circuit reversed. 
Justice Scalia, for the Court, noted that the situation 
seemed to call for an implicit antitrust immunity. The 1996 Act 
created interconnection duties and those duties could be en-
forced—and were enforced here—through the appropriate 
regulators. That would seem to suffice, and there would be 
some risk that additional antitrust enforcement would interfere 
with the regulatory scheme. So the Court might have held, but 
for the savings clause, which precluded such a claim of implicit 
immunity. 
Instead, the Court turned to the question of whether anti-
trust law, as distinct from regulation, imposed on Verizon a 
duty to deal with entrants. Antitrust rarely imposes mandatory 
obligations, other than as a remedy for an independent antitrust 
violation. The Aspen Skiing case represents one prominent ex-
ception to that statement, and whatever the merits of Aspen 
(see Carlton (2001) for criticism), the Court saw little reason to 
expand mandatory obligations here. Indeed, just the opposite: 
“The 1996 Act’s extensive provision for access makes it un-
necessary to impose a judicial doctrine of forced access.” The 
Court ruled that the antitrust laws imposed no duty to deal on 
Verizon. 
The savings clause reflects the idea of antitrust and regula-
tion as complementary mechanisms to control competition. As 
suggested in the introduction to this section, Congress might 
want to implement complementarity as a way of imposing a 
check on the regulatory agents that implement particular indus-
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notwithstanding, the existence of industry-specific legislation 
imposes limits on how far industry regulators can deviate from 
the principles at stake in antitrust. The difficulty is in imple-
menting that idea in a particular situation. In Trinko itself, the 
Court recognized that antitrust has only weakly embraced af-
firmative duties, with Aspen Skiing seemingly representing the 
outer limits for antitrust itself. Given antitrust’s own deficits in 
the area of affirmative dealing, the Court wisely decided that 
Trinko would have represented a particularly poor situation to 
try to use antitrust to police errant telcom regulators. 
B. Airlines 
Congress established the Civil Aeronautics Administration, 
which later became the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), in 
1938. The CAB regulated fares and entry. They cross-
subsidized low-density short-haul routes with revenues from 
low-cost long-haul routes. The CAB rarely allowed mergers 
unless bankruptcy was imminent (Morrison and Winston 
(2000), p. 9). By the 1970s, the CAB began to allow entry. 
Several airlines were in the process of initiating lawsuits 
against the CAB for violating its Congressional mandate, when 
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was passed. (Interest-
ingly, the largest domestic carrier at the time, United, favored 
deregulation.) Airline regulation was phased out and the CAB 
was abolished in 1984 (see Carlton and Perloff (2005)). 
In response to widespread criticism of regulation, airline 
competition was deregulated and controlled only by antitrust. 
Deregulation set in motion forces that are still working their 
way through the airline system. Fares fell substantially after 
deregulation with typical estimates being 20% or more (see 
e.g., Morrison and Winston (2000, p. 2)). The menu of fares on 
a typical route grew. Cross subsidies were eliminated (the CAB 
had eliminated cross subsidies based on distance in the 1970s). 
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tion. For example, of the 58 carriers that began operations be-
tween 1978 and 1990, only one (America West) is still operat-
ing (Morrison and Winston (2000, p. 9)). 
Airlines developed hub-and-spoke networks (with South-
west being a notable exception) through merger and internal 
expansion and as a result reduced their need to rely on another 
airline for interconnection. For example, in 1979 25% of trips 
involved connections and of those 39% involved another air-
line. By 1989, there were more connecting flights as a result of 
the hub-and-spoke system, with the effect being that 33% of 
trips involved connections and of those less than 5% involved 
an interconnection with another airline. 
There was considerable merger activity and agreements 
among airlines to cooperate on flight schedules and the setting 
of through-fares when a passenger travels on two airlines to 
reach his final destination. (These agreements are called alli-
ances or code-sharing agreements.) The Department of Justice 
challenged several mergers and alliances and its opposition re-
cently ended the attempt of United to merge with US Air, and 
also ended the proposed alliances between American and US 
Air and between Delta and United.9 
As a result of mergers and firm expansion, concentration 
has risen nationally. The four-firm concentration ratio has risen 
from 56% in 1977 to 71% in 2003 (Wessel (2004)). But con-
centration at hubs has behaved very differently than concentra-
tion at non-hubs. At hub airports, the HHI rose from a median 
of under 2200 pre-deregulation to a median of 3700 by 1989, 
while at non-hub airports, the HHI fell from 3200 in 1979 to 
about 2200 in 1989 (Bamberger and Carlton (2002)). 
Despite regulation, airlines proved to be a poor investment. 
During regulation, especially the 1970s, service competition 
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eroded a significant portion of airline earnings. Since deregula-
tion, fierce price competition has led to the bankruptcy of sev-
eral airlines and indeed several major airlines were recently 
either in bankruptcy or are close to it. (“As of 1992 ..., the 
money that has been made since the dawn of aviation by all of 
this country’s airline companies has been zero. .... . If I’d been 
at Kitty Hawk in 1903, I would have been farsighted enough 
and public spirited enough—I owed this to future capitalist—to 
shoot him down.” Warren Buffet as reported in Wessel 
(2004)). Deregulation also led to lower wages for employees 
and increased productivity. 
The behavior of the airline industry post-deregulation illus-
trates that a once regulated industry may be prone to antitrust 
violations in the aftermath of regulation. This could occur be-
cause collective action is needed for efficiency or simply be-
cause firms in the industry have gotten used to acting in con-
cert during regulation. We think the airline industry illustrates 
well the heightened antitrust liability that can attend a network 
industry when it is deregulated. 
Prior to deregulation, airlines relied on each other to inter-
connect passengers. That meant that airlines would have to set 
some fares jointly and decide how to split the revenue. So, for 
example, if airline 1 flies from A to B, and airline 2 flies from 
B to C, the two airlines could coordinate their flight times so 
that a traveler could conveniently go from A to C (with a 
change of plane at B). The two airlines would collectively set a 
fare for A to C travel and share it in some way. Also, airlines, 
post-regulation, developed sophisticated pricing methods re-
quiring booking agents to keep track of multiple fares and seat 
availability. 
This created two problems. First, travel agents needed 
complex software to allow them to book tickets. Second, travel 
agents had to have up-to-date information on pricing and seat 
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daily. The pricing of airlines sometimes involved large swings 
in price and its pricing is more complicated than pricing in 
many other markets. These characteristics created the incentive 
for certain acts that could achieve efficiencies but might also 
be used to harm competition. Significant antitrust litigation 
against the airlines ensued post-deregulation.  
The tendency of airlines to cooperate in the setting of 
through-fares when traffic is shared can be a natural and desir-
able way for two airlines to provide a service to consumers that 
neither airline, on its own, could provide. It could also be a 
ploy by which one airline bribes another to prevent expansion 
of competing routes. (If you don’t enter route BC, where I fly, I 
will interline with your AB route and let you keep a large frac-
tion of the through-fare from A to C. In that way, you have no 
incentive to enter BC and compete with me on that route.) This 
last concern has caused the Department of Justice to investi-
gate several proposed domestic airline alliances. And, as al-
ready mentioned, these investigations have scuttled proposed 
alliances between American and US Airways, and between 
Delta and United. 
The need to have software to book tickets led to several 
cases and investigations into computer reservation systems 
(CRS) where the concern was that the CRS system used by a 
travel agent favored the airline that produced the CRS system. 
So, for example, if a travel agent used the Sabre system origi-
nally developed by American Airlines, that system displayed 
information about American Airlines flights more prominently 
than other airlines. As a result of the government investigation, 
detailed rules on “unbiasedness” were agreed to (See Guerin-
Calvert and Noll (1991)). Today, CRS systems are no longer 
privately owned by the airlines.  
The need to have updates of the massive number of daily 
fare changes led to a Department of Justice investigation of 
information sharing amongst the airlines. Most of the airlines 44    February 13, 2007January 25, 2007 
 
would provide information each day on all their fares by route. 
The information in a “notes section” would contain relevant 
fare restrictions (e.g., weekend stays, advance purchase re-
quirements) as well as the date the fare became effective and 
expired. This information on fares was transmitted to The Air-
line Tariff Publishing Company (ATPCO) which then made a 
master computer tape and distributed it to all airlines and travel 
agents. ATPCO was owned by the airlines. 
The Department of Justice alleged that ATPCO was being 
used as a mechanism to coordinate pricing. One allegation was 
that the notes section was used to communicate price signals. 
So for example if airline 1 cut price on an important route of 
airline 2, airline 2 would retaliate and cut price on an important 
route of airline 1. To make sure airline 1 understood why it had 
cut fares, airline 2 could put a note to indicate why it had cut 
price in an attempt to convince airline 1 to withdraw its low 
fares on airline 2’s routes. 
A related allegation was that the first effective and last ef-
fective ticket date were used to make it easier to coordinate 
pricing. So, for example, if airline 1 wanted to raise fares, it 
would announce an increase to take effect in say two weeks. If 
other airlines did not match, or only partly matched, airline 1 
could rescind or revise its fare increase and not suffer any loss 
of business because the fare increase had not yet gone into ef-
fect. The airlines denied the government allegations.10 The air-
lines settled the case by agreeing to eliminate extraneous notes 
and by abandoning the use of first ticket dates. Interestingly, 
analysis of fares post-settlement show no effect from the set-
tlement (Borenstein (2004)). 
The sometimes wild price swings that occur when new en-
trants start servicing a route has led to both litigation and gov-
ernment investigations. In a city pair that can support only one 
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or a few carriers, competition from a new rival not only can 
expand capacity a lot but can induce responses from the in-
cumbents. In response to an aggressive price and output re-
sponse by an incumbent, allegations of predation are often 
made. The precise definition of predation in an industry such as 
airlines with large fixed costs on a route but small variable 
costs is not well established, especially on a route where only 
one carrier can survive (Edlin and Farrell (2004)). But the ob-
servation that fares frequently plummet below levels that are 
financially viable has led to demands for government interven-
tion. 
In U.S. v. AMR et al. (140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (2001), aff’d, 
335 F.3d 1109 (10
th Cir. 2003)), the Department of Justice ac-
cused American Airlines of practicing price predation. Ameri-
can Airlines competed out of Dallas Fort Worth with several 
low cost airlines (Vanguard, Western Pacific, Sun Jet). Ameri-
can lowered its fares, and increased its seat availability in re-
sponse to these low cost airlines, causing them to abandon their 
routes. After the low cost airlines exited, American reduced the 
number of flights and raised prices to roughly their initial lev-
els. American responded that its prices exceeded average vari-
able costs, and moved for summary judgment which was 
granted.  
Just prior to the Department of Justice case, the Department 
of Transportation initiated an investigation of predation in the 
airline industry. It investigated several incidents in which it 
was alleged that incumbents routinely responded to entry of 
low cost carriers by lowering fares, expanding output and driv-
ing them out of business, at which point fares rose. In a de-
tailed study of entry and exit patterns (submitted to the De-
partment of Transportation on behalf of United), Bamberger 
and Carlton (2006) found that entry and exit on routes were 
extremely common amongst both low cost carriers and estab-
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lines, there were very high exit rates amongst both low cost 
and regular carriers. The Department of Transportation 
dropped its attempt to define predation standards. As an aside, 
between 2000 and 2005, the share of passengers served by low-
cost airlines has risen from 23% to 26%. 
C. Railroads11 
As Gilligan, Marshall and Weingast (1989) note, the conse-
quences of the Interstate Commerce Act are complex. One 
view is that it was a mechanism to benefit the railroads. But as 
with most regulated industries the regulators had other interest 
groups to satisfy and did. Cross subsidy to high-cost, low-
density routes and to short-haul shippers emerged; indeed, that 
was one of the central designs of the law, as it banned long-
haul/short-haul discrimination. Price discrimination in which 
high value-added products had higher rates than bulk also 
emerged to placate certain shipper interest groups. In what was 
to be important later, regulators controlled not only entry but 
also exit from a route. The emergence of the truck (and air-
planes) complicated the regulatory calculations. 
Control of trucking became necessary to protect railroads 
and did occur in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. As trucking 
(especially its union, the Teamsters) developed as its own pow-
erful interest group, the interest of railroads waned and rail-
roads got clobbered financially, resulting in numerous bank-
ruptcies. Trucks siphoned off the profitable high value-added 
shipments and eroded this source of revenue that railroads used 
for cross subsidy. The restrictions on abandonment of routes 
created enormous inefficiencies. The deregulation of the rail-
roads in 1976 (4R Act) and in 1980 (Staggers Act) removed 
most regulations but placed merger control in the hands of the 
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Surface Transportation Board (STB), not the Department of 
Justice. It streamlined the process for merging. 
After deregulation, there was massive abandonment of 
track, reductions in employment, decline in certain rates, and 
massive consolidation that is still ongoing. Roughly one third 
of tracks was abandoned, real operating costs fell in the 20-
year period following deregulation by about 60 percent, em-
ployment has been estimated to be about 60 percent lower as a 
result of deregulation (Davis and Wilson (1999)), rail volumes 
started to grow again, and industry profitability improved. 
Rates fell (Burton (1993)), especially for high value-added 
products, and service improved. 
“Before deregulation, mergers typically involved railroads 
with substantial parallel trackage … . In contrast, mergers in 
the post-Staggers period have been primarily end-to-end” 
(Vellturo et al. (1992), pp. 341-42). Mergers in the first six 
years of deregulation reduced the number of large railroads 
(Class I) from 36 to 16 (Grimm and Winston (2000), pp. 45-46 
citing Chaplin and Schmidt (1999)). Continued merger activity 
has left only two railroads servicing the West and also the East 
(see also Ivaldi and McCullough (2005)). Using figures from 
the Association of American Railroads, the number of Class I 
railroads declined from 40 in 1980 to 7 in 2004. According to a 
study by the Department of Agriculture, the HHI of railroads in 
the East has increased from 1364 in 1980 to 4297 in 1999 and 
in the West from 1364 to 4502. (Source: Comments of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture before the Surface Transportation 
Board, STB Docket No. 34000, Canadian National Railway 
Co. et al—Control—Wisconsin Central Railway Co., June 25, 
2001). 
Despite opposition from The Department of Justice to 
many of the major mergers, STB has approved them. We be-
lieve that the reason the STB was given merger authority rather 
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were anticipated that would lead to increased rates from re-
duced competition, and this was perceived as a benefit by the 
proponents of deregulation (which included the railroads). 
“The railroad industry is perhaps the only U.S. industry that 
has been, or ever will be, deregulated because of its poor finan-
cial performance under regulation” (Grimm and Winston 
(2000), p. 41). Indeed, although railroads rates in general have 
declined, captive shippers now have much less protection than 
before deregulation and pay substantial rate differentials com-
pared to non-captive shippers. 
In March 2000, the STB issued a moratorium on mergers. 
In June 2001, it issued new merger regulations in which 
merged carriers would have an increased burden to show that 
the proposed merger would not harm competition. There have 
been no mergers among Class I railroads since. Recently, there 
have been congressional attempts to remove the antitrust im-
munity of railroads regarding mergers and other pricing mat-
ters (Gallagher (2006)). 
D. Trucks 
As already discussed, trucking regulation emerged under the 
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 partly as an attempt to control com-
petition with railroads. The trucking industry, especially its un-
ions, was able to become a powerful interest group whom regu-
lators protected from competition. (Estimates are that wages 
were 30 percent higher or more than otherwise, and that this 
premium accounted for the bulk of the regulatory rents to 
trucking. (See Rose (1987) and Moore (1978).)) Entry was 
controlled with carriers needing certificates to carry certain 
commodities on particular routes. Rates were regulated. 
The trucking industry is composed of two very different 
segments, truck load (TL) and less than truck load (LTL). The 
TL segment consists of firms that ship in truckloads from ori-
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firms that will pick up several small shipments, and deliver 
them to their final destinations after making several stops to 
either pick up or drop off other shipments. Therefore, the LTL 
segment is a network industry where scale (or geographic 
scope) matters, while the TL segment is not. Deregulation had 
very different effects on these two segments. 
Deregulation led to an increase in the total number of 
trucking firms. For example, the number of certified carriers 
rose from about 18,000 in 1980 to about 40,000 by the end of 
the 1980’s (Nebesky et al. (1995)). In sharp contrast, the num-
ber of LTL carriers fell from around 600 firms in the late 1970s 
to 237 firms in the late 1980s and to 135 firms by the early 
1990s (Feitler et al. (1997)). Moreover, there was evidence that 
pre-deregulation, LTL carriers earned rents that were elimi-
nated after deregulation. 
Although LTL carriers have increased in size, they did not 
rely on merger but rather on expansion of the territory of indi-
vidual carriers. (Mergers were not used in order to avoid being 
struck with unfunded pension liabilities. Post deregulation, the 
value of an active firm was negative after the value of its oper-
ating certificate fell (Boyer (1993))). Although the evidence 
seems to confirm that regulation forced the LTL sector to have 
too many firms, evidence on scale in the LTL sector (Giordono 
(1997)) supports the view that there will remain a sufficient 
number of efficient LTL carriers to preserve competition. 
The deregulation of trucking applied to interstate but not 
intrastate shipments. States were able to, and some did, regu-
late rates and entry of intrastate trucking. Some states explicitly 
granted antitrust immunity, while others did not. (In the 38 
states that regulated trucking under 500 pounds, 22 had granted 
antitrust immunity to truckers as of 1987.) Econometric analy-
sis (Daniel and Kleit (1995)) of rates in the states that still 
regulated trucking showed that in the LTL segment entry regu-
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percent and antitrust immunity by about 12 percent. In the TL 
segment, only rate regulation had a statistically significant ef-
fect on price -- more than 32 percent. As of 1994, Congres-
sional legislation forbids states from regulating trucking rates, 
except for moving companies. 
Although employment in trucking continued to grow after 
deregulation, one estimate finds that deregulation caused a re-
duction of 250,000 to 300,000 union jobs, or about 20 percent 
of total workers in trucking (Hunter and Mangum (1995)). This 
is further evidence that trucking regulation was heavily influ-
enced by the powerful Teamsters Union. Moreover the wage 
effect in the LTL segment was small but wages declined sig-
nificantly in the TL sector (Belzer (1995)). 
*** 
Although we have not examined all regulated industries, 
we have looked at several. Regulation created numerous ineffi-
ciencies and benefited special groups. In response to criticisms 
of regulation, antitrust either completely or partially replaced 
regulation and antitrust was used as a complement and some-
times as a constraint on regulators in many industries. The de-
regulated network industries that we examined all show a simi-
lar pattern: after deregulation, there is massive consolidation, a 
lessening of the reliance on interconnection from other firms, a 
decline in either wages or employment or both, and a fall in 
prices with a reduction or end to any cross subsidy. Consumers 
benefit, special interests are harmed. 
Conclusion 
More than a century ago, the federal government started con-
trolling competition, first railroads through the Interstate 
Commerce Act and then the general economy under the 
Sherman Act. The Commerce Act assigned primary responsi-
bility to the first great federal agency, the Interstate Commerce Carlton & Picker  Antitrust and Regulation  51 
 
Commission, while the Sherman Act relied for its implementa-
tion on federal courts of general jurisdiction. Since that time, 
there has been an ongoing struggle to formulate the appropriate 
policy for controlling competition and to determine the right 
balance between antitrust and regulation for implementing that 
policy. 
Regulation and antitrust are two competing mechanisms to 
control competition. The early history in which special courts 
were established and then abolished, and in which the FTC was 
created illustrate this point. The relative advantages and disad-
vantages of each mechanism became clearer over time. Regula-
tion produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, 
but was able to specify prices and specific rules of how firms 
should deal with each other. Antitrust, especially when it be-
came economically coherent within the past 30 years or so, 
showed itself to be reasonably good at promoting competition, 
avoiding the favoring of special interests, but not good at for-
mulating specific rules for particular industries. The partial and 
full deregulation movement was a response to the recognition 
of the relative advantages of regulation and antitrust. This does 
not mean that no sector will be regulated, but rather that com-
petition, constrained only by antitrust, will be used over more 
activities, even in regulated industries.  
Aside from being viewed as substitutes, antitrust and regu-
lation can also be viewed as complements in which the activi-
ties of an industry can be subject to both regulatory and anti-
trust scrutiny. In this way, the complementary use of regulation 
and antitrust can assign control of competition to courts and 
regulatory agencies based on their relative strengths, and in 
some settings, antitrust can act as a constraint on what regula-
tors can do. The trends in network industries indicate that regu-
lators, not antitrust courts, will bear the responsibility for for-
mulating interconnection policies in partially deregulated in-
dustries, but antitrust will remain in the background as a club 52    February 13, 2007January 25, 2007 
 
that firms can use if regulators allow incumbents to acquire 
market power either through merger or predatory acts.  
The history shows that at least for the United States, the in-
creased use of the Sherman Act instead of regulation to control 
competition, and when necessary, the complementary use of 
the two, has brought benefits to consumers. 
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